Spitfire documentary

martinw

Thanks.
Thread ruined.

lasermonkey

I would definitely read Stephen Bungay's The Most Dangerous Enemy if you have more than a passing interest in the BoB. Many of the oft quoted "facts" are dispelled by diligent analysis of the records.

What is interesting is that the Luftwaffe's attacks on the airfields was actually rather ineffective. Grass airfields can be easily repaired and as has been mentioned, there were plenty of satellite airfields to deploy to. Also, the Luftwaffe's intelligence was very poor, and many of the airfields being attacked weren't fighter bases. Read The Hardest Day by Alfred Price to get a sense of these attacks and how they were dealt with.

Bungay made, or at least contributed to, a TV programme where he used computer modelling to predict what would have happened if the Luftwaffe had continued to attack the airfields, taking into account the weather, tactics, losses and replacements. The modelling suggested that within two months, the Luftwaffe would have simply run out of aircraft and aircrew, with the RAF being able to sustain losses  pretty much indefinitely. Whilst Fighter Command was hard pressed, they were replacing aircrew and had a good reserve of fighters. Off the top of my head, I believe reserves were around 25% and increasing. This suggests that by targetting London, Goering may well have saved the Luftwaffe from destruction. It's an interesting notion, for sure.

The Luftwaffe's poor intelligence also neglected to realise that the small scale raids mounted by Erprobungsgruppe 210 (again, from memory) were causing significant damage beyond the numbers of aircraft involved. These small raids by fighter-bombers were very difficult to intercept and the targets, such as aircraft factories, well chosen. Luckily for us, Luftwaffe high command had no idea how successful these raids were, and they were discontinued.

The radar stations were difficult targets to destroy, especially the open frame masts. Luftwaffe high command had suspected before the war that these masts may have been something to do with radar and despatched an airship loaded with electronics to determine their purpose. Whilst the RAF was able to accurately track the airship, the electronics on the airship, for reasons I can't remember, failed to detect anything of interest, leading high command to consider these masts not particularly important. The damage that was sustained in attacks on the radar stations was repaired fairly quickly and Dowding's foresight in establishing what was the world's first integrated air defence system meant that any breaks in the chain could be temporarily plugged. Remember that the Air Observer Corps also played a vital role in reporting the height, direction and numbers of enemy formations and all this data was sent to Bentley Priory, filtered and analysed. Simply put, the RAF knew exactly what was happening, whilst the Luftwaffe was clueless. Mostly.

Regarding Luftwaffe morale, this had taken a severe beating during the BoB. Before that, they had swept all before them, although one should take into account their failure to destroy the BEF at Dunkirk. The stress of fighting the BoB led to a new word: Kanalkrank or Channel sickness. Some 3,200 aircrew were lost (KIA, missing or captured) during the battle and almost 2,000 aircraft destroyed, at a time when German production was unable to keep up. It's interesting to speculate whether the Russian campaign would have fared better if they'd still had these assets.

Although Leigh-Mallory and Bader had been advocates of the Big Wing theory, Keith Park's tactics of sending in squadrons at a time had a devastating effect on German morale. Bomber pilots were quoted as saying that from the moment they approached the English coast, they were constantly attacked. The massed formations advocated by Leigh-Mallory's 12 Group took a long time to form up and if they did reach the enemy in time, tended to get in each other's way. Keith Park's handling of 11 Group was exemplary. He knew exactly how to handle his resources and much of the final outcome must be attributed to him. Leigh-Mallory's subsequent sabotage of Park's career is a dark stain on RAF history and it is telling that when Park was posted to Malta, he turned that situation around quickly.

Speaking of tactics, although the Luftwaffe had been able to develop their tactics during the Spanish Civil War, the RAF caught on fairly quickly, at least at unit level. Fighter Command training was still teaching the "vic" of three aircraft, but experienced squadrons quickly trained new pilots with the leader/wingman and "finger four" principles.

Fighter Command was adept at interpreting the data coming in from the radar stations and Observer Corps and ignored the fighter sweeps that the Jagdwaffe were sending in order to draw up Fighter Command. Interestingly, once Park had been moved on and the RAF began its own Channel sweeps, Leigh-Mallory repeated exactly the same mistakes that the Luftwaffe made, whilst the Luftwaffe learned from the RAF.

There have been plenty of discussions about the relative qualities of the fighter aircraft used during the BoB, but Bungay makes some interesting conclusions in The Most Dangerous Enemy. After studying the various engagements and actual losses, one thing becomes clear: in fighter vs fighter engagements, the aircraft most likely to shoot down its opponent was the Spitfire. Also, the aircraft most likely to get its pilot out of harm's way when attacked was the Spitfire. The only time the Bf 109E was consistently at an advantage was when bouncing from up-sun, when its superior dive rate gave it a distinctive edge. That is to say only when the German fighters could surprise the British, shoot down a number and then dive away unmolested, were they consistently victorious. Whenever there was a melee, you'd be better off in a Spitfire. When you consider all the disadvantages that the RAF had to contend with (outdated tactics in some cases, less experienced pilots and as some historians love to point out- I'm looking at you, James Holland- the supposedly inferior rifle calibre ammunition and inferior dive rate to the '109) the Spitfire still came out on top.

Another point to make in the comparison is that the Spitfire Mk I was still the first version, although with a few modifications from the very earliest examples (armoured windscreen, pilot seat armour and three-bladed airscrew spring to mind). The Bf 109E was the fifth version, on its second engine type (third, if you include the Rolls Royce Kestrel of the prototype). I guess you could say that Mitchell got the Spitfire more right first time than Willy did with his '109.

The Spit Mk II was introduced during the battle. The Mk II had a more powerful Merlin engine and the Rotol constant speed airscrew as standard. Both of these features improved performance. The Rotol prop was retrofitted to many Mk Is (which had the de Havilland 2-speed props) and the majority of Hurricanes, as these were seen as needing the improvements in performance more. A few Mk Ibs were issued to No. 19 Squadron. These had two Hispano 20mm cannons, but had an alarming tendency to jam. They were quickly returned. Once modified (and with the addition of the four outer .303" MGs), they were issued to No. 92 Squadron, but by then the battle was largely over. This armament configuration was subsequently the most common on the Spitfire.

Sorry for the ramble, but the BoB and the Spitfire in particular are my favourite subjects of study. Coincidentally, today (5th March) marks the Spitfire's 82nd birthday, as prototype K5054 made her first flight on 5/3/36. Still the most beautiful thing crafted my mankind, IMHO.

ESBlonde

It's a facinating battle given that many secrets and facts have now become known. The RAF is correctly credited with gallentry, the real danger for the German seaborne invasion was twofold, the Royal Navy (very powerful and feared by the Germans) and the weather. No invasion would be undertaken while either were a threat. Destroying the RAF ment that the Navy would have no aircover and the luftwaffe could be used against it to even the battle should it develop.

As far as the Radar was concerned, the Germans few and airship up and down the north sea trying to work out what the radio towers were. They were monitoring the wrong frequencies and concluded they were homing devices for lost RAF aircraft (that made sense at the time because the germans were developing such a system themselves).

Because of the success in Spain (civil war) Poland, France and the Low countries the Luftwaffe was over confident and were not geared up with sustained training and production to replace losses, why would they, all earlier battles lasted days or weeks at best! The battle of France actually inflicted damage on the Luftwaffes ability to wage war before the BoB even began.

The luftwaffe put pilots in the front line and there they stayed. The RAF had 'Tours' where they were cycled to less active areas or off to training camp to pass on thier skills. As a result there were always squadrons in reserve even if it meant leaving area like Wales or the northwest exposed (thay never happened though).

The switch to attacks on london was triggered by the RAF bombers attacking Berlin. At that stage of the War Germany thought they had all but won and they had no blackout etc. The shock of being bombed at home led Hitler into a rage and stunned many Germans. The actual damage was negligable, indeed the damage done to out bombers was probably more costly than the damage done to German soil. I'm not aware of who orderred that raid but i suspect it was a churchillian gamble of which he played a good number.

Once the raids by the Germans reached to London they were at a disadvantage on the range of thier fighter protection and also they came into range of the fighter groups based at Martlesham, Duxford, North Weald etc. Given the advance warning these groups could assemble large numbers of fighters and attack on masse. The sudden appearance of all these aircraft was demoralising to the German aircrew who were being told the RAF was finished. The truth being quite different.

As a game of brinkmanship the British authorities played a blinder. Indeed it was a deadly game of sport played by young men who had just left school for the most part. Plenty went wrong and we hear less about that. All telephone connections between defence installations were above ground and not protected! That left them vulnerable but provided easy access for rapid repair.  Radar didn't work inland (read on the battle of Barking Creek https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Barking_Creek) but the royal observer corps was already in existence and so was strengthened to monitor aircraft once over the coast and report up the chain of command.

Some very enterprising industrialists made it possible to manufacture fighters despite the prevailing difficulties. the likes of Lord Nuffield and the newspaper tycone Lord Beaverbrook moved mountains to get production dispersed and still increase numbers.

There are so many books written and the whole picture is becomming clear but how much each aspect really influenced the outcome remains one of some conjecture. It was in the end the sum of it's parts. None the less a fascinating period in our history.

darthed1981

lasermonkey said:

I would definitely read Stephen Bungay's The Most Dangerous Enemy if you have more than a passing interest in the BoB. Many of the oft quoted "facts" are dispelled by diligent analysis of the records.

Excellent post @lasermonkey and yes I totally agree Bungay's book is currently the definitive work IMO.

Also agree about Holland, an excellent historian but a habit of getting an idea in his teeth and hanging on to it for dear life, still his account is also very good.

Len Deighton's Fighter is also very good.

lasermonkey

So far I've read Bungay's Most Dangerous Enemy, Price's The Hardest Day and Woods/Dempster's The Narrow Margin, which seem to be amongst the most respected books on the subject. I definitely need to read more on Keith Park. The man is unfairly neglected by history.

darthed1981

lasermonkey said:

So far I've read Bungay's Most Dangerous Enemy, Price's The Hardest Day and Woods/Dempster's The Narrow Margin, which seem to be amongst the most respected books on the subject. I definitely need to read more on Keith Park. The man is unfairly neglected by history.

Agreed completely, while Dowding generally gets credit (not enough) Park is really not given enough.  As you said, his handling of the resources available to him was masterful.

fandango

lasermonkey said:

So far I've read Bungay's Most Dangerous Enemy, Price's The Hardest Day and Woods/Dempster's The Narrow Margin, which seem to be amongst the most respected books on the subject. I definitely need to read more on Keith Park. The man is unfairly neglected by history.

Sir Keith Park was a Kiwi, and is honoured back in New Zealand, especially Auckland where he hailed from.

If memory serves, Park was critical of the massed response (promoted by Douglas Bader) of fighters to the German air invasion because it meant that the first fighters up were hanging around in formation wasting fuel, and thus reducing the effective combat time. I'm trying to remember if I read that the massed strategy got a fair amount of support and stick from the pilots.

darthed1981

fandango said:

If memory serves, Park was critical of the massed response (promoted by Douglas Bader) of fighters to the German air invasion because it meant that the first fighters up were hanging around in formation wasting fuel, and thus reducing the effective combat time. I'm trying to remember if I read that the massed strategy got a fair amount of support and stick from the pilots.

The "Big Wing" idea was popular with some pilots because for the average pilot attacking a bomber formation at squadron strength with 50-100 Bf-109s circling above felt rather unfair, they no dealt felt far more outnumbered than the RAF actually were at times.  The battle could be and has been argued to being a showdown between 1000 Bf-109s and 750 Spitfires and Hurricanes (on average).  Seen in this light and given the limitations of fuel and being on the offensive, it actually seems downright unlikely the Luftwaffe could have won.

Many realised what Park was doing though.  Bader never accepted that he was wrong, but then Bader probably never admitted the daft stunt that cost him his legs was wrong, he just wasn't that kind of guy.  Even Johnnie Johnson, who disagreed strongly with Bader after the war about the "Big Wing" acknowledged Bader as a superb leader of men, however.

The "Big Wing" also heavily overclaimed, post-war research indicated that while they came home with amazing claims the Luftwaffe's losses were often far less. 

The smaller units overclaimed as well, but there were funny stories.  One pilot on his own chanced on an unaware formation of Bf-109s and shot down four before they noticed he was there.  On his return, the intelligence officer didn't believe him, so found himself bundled in the pilot's car to go find all four wrecks, claims were duly awarded!

ESBlonde

One of the overiding faults of the big wing was the time to assemble and climb to altitude in a critical short time, it just wouldn't work for aircraft based in kent facing the first brunt of the attack. However the Big wing had adequate warning to assemble and meat the bombers as they reached london or often as they were leaving london post attack. The shock value against the German airmen was huge and the comfort for the rookie RAF pilots likewise, many started to survive thier first contact with the enemy which was always a problem. Air combat is swift and deadly, you probably won't see who gets you etc.

Sir Keith Park was sent to Malta after the battle where he re-enacted the whole struggle again agains the italians and then also the luftwaffe in another battle with a number of similarities (lack of pilots,aircraft,fuel,ammunition, food, tools etc.) the man was under rated but proved himself and his ideas when it mattered.

Rocker

In the book, FLYING COLOURS The Epic Story of Douglas Bader by Laddie Lucas, Appendix C has a transcript of the address by Bader at a service of thanksgiving for the life and work of Sir Keith Park.

In that address, Bader spoke of the tremendous service Park gave the country and how the strain of his position affected him. And how he looked when they met in 1969.